In April 1944, the United States Navy launched a second major assault on Truk Atoll, following the success of Operation Hailstone in February. This raid, part of the larger Pacific campaign during World War II, demonstrated the capability of U.S. carrier-based air power to neutralize significant Japanese strongholds without the need for costly invasions.
In February, Operation Hailstone had devastated Truk’s naval capacity, destroying ships, aircraft, and infrastructure. This success led to the cancellation of a planned invasion of Truk, with resources redirected toward the upcoming invasion of the Marianas in June. However, by April, Japanese forces had begun to rebuild their air defenses at Truk, reinforcing the garrison with planes salvaged from earlier damage and relocated from other bases. Concerned about potential threats to upcoming operations, the U.S. Navy’s Task Force 58, commanded by Admiral Raymond Spruance, undertook a second raid on the atoll from April 30 to May 1, 1944.
Task Force 58 had grown more formidable, with three task groups now consisting of multiple carriers, including fleet carriers like USS Hornet, Enterprise, and Lexington, and light carriers such as USS Belleau Wood, Cowpens, and Bataan. With over 650 aircraft on board, the task force was backed by a powerful escort of battleships, cruisers, and destroyers. Night fighter operations had also been refined, further enhancing the fleet’s defensive capabilities.
The April raid unfolded in a similar fashion to February’s Operation Hailstone. A pre-dawn fighter sweep was launched, and despite Japanese preparations, including dawn patrols and radar detection, the U.S. Hellcats quickly overwhelmed the defending Japanese planes. Throughout the two-day operation, the Americans systematically destroyed Truk’s remaining air power and infrastructure. They flattened airfields, workshops, hangars, and key installations on several islands, including Moen, Eten, and Dublon. Shipping in Truk Lagoon also suffered further losses, though fewer vessels remained after February’s devastation.
In total, U.S. Navy aircraft flew 2,200 sorties, dropped 748 tons of bombs, and decimated Japanese air power. Of the 167 Japanese aircraft at Truk before the raid, only 12 were flyable by the end of the operation. U.S. losses were minimal: 35 aircraft were lost, mostly to anti-aircraft fire, and only 18 airmen were killed.
By the raid’s conclusion, Truk was rendered incapable of supporting Japan’s Pacific operations, and it posed no further threat to the upcoming Marianas campaign. Although the Japanese rebuilt some of the air garrison, much of it was soon transferred elsewhere, leaving Truk largely abandoned as a military base. This raid effectively ended Truk’s strategic importance in the Pacific War, cementing the role of air power in bypassing heavily fortified positions.